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The great depression followed by the Second War placed the Brazilian economy
continuously under severe constraints. Industrial capacity and the infrastructure were
under strain as difficulties were faced in relation to the access to resources to finance the
maintenance of existing capacity and capital goods imports. This was due at first to
balance of payments restrictions, then, during the war, to supply and transportation
constraints. There was a dearth of capital goods after many lean years. There was also a
clear expectation that United States financial support would be forthcoming as Brazil had
provided to the US air bases in Brazil which had been a vital link to supply Africa and
Brazilian troops had seen action in Italy.
The deposition of Vargas had led to the victory of General Dutra, a mainstream
conservative candidate, without great political divergences with Vargas whom he had
served as a rather pro-German Minister of War. In the economic field the lack of
continuity was more marked as a group of liberally inclined civil servants occupied key
positions in the Federal government. The emphasis of the new administration unwritten
economic programme was placed on the need to invest in the infrastructure with the help
of the United States and to control inflation, which had accelerated significantly since
1942. The most influential explanation for the acceleration of inflation  was advanced by
Gudin, the doyen of the critics of Vargas’ policies. The public finance imbalance and the
constraints on imports were singled out as important factors to explain the high rates of
inflation. But Gudin also believed, and this “structural”explanation was certainly
overemphasised at the time, that an important source of inflationary pressure was the
imbalance between investments in the expansion of productive capacity of capital goods
and those directed to the production of wage goods. This criticism of Vargas’ industrial
policies, and especially of the Volta Redonda project, was quickly endorsed by the
government but does not seem to fit well with the data available on industrial structural
trends. While the composition of investment may have had a marginal impact on the
inflation rate its acceleration seems to be closely related to the government inability to
mop up demand  through a combination of rationing and the sale of government bonds.
With the new government the embryo of a central bank was created in the form of a
Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito-SUMOC [Superintendence of Money and
Credit] linked to the Bank of Brazil.3
1. The quest for re-equipment: 1946-1955
The emphasis on stabilisation led to the government falling on the trap of
overvaluation. The exchange rate, which should have been devalued from an average of
around Cr$18.50/US$ dollar to some Cr$30/US$ if the objective was to maintain the
1939 real exchange rate level, was maintained at roughly the same level in nominal terms
when legal parity was declared to the International Monetary Fund. There are indications
that this decision reflected an unwarranted optimism amongst liberal economists, and
made explicit by Eugênio Gudin, about favourable structural changes which had affected
the Brazilian balance of payments. So during about one year and a half a highly
overvalued rate was adopted and the Brazilian exchange regime was liberalised with the
removal of controls.
Imports increased 84% in 1946 and then again more than 72% in 1947 to reach
US$1,012 million. Import prices increased more than 32% in the period. Although the
level of foreign exchange and gold reserves had increased to reach US$ 730 million by
the end of 1946 about 37 % of the total reserves were inconvertible, of which US$ 240
million in sterling. Brazil’s trade with the dollar area was heavily in deficit so that the
small dollar reserves were rapidly eroded. In 1947 the share of US goods in total imports
reached 61.3%, its peak level in the 1940’s. By mid-1947 dollar reserves had
disappeared, but gold reserves were still substantial, so that the government faced the
choice of converting part of the gold reserves, devaluing the cruzeiro or maintaining an
overvalued rate with the introduction of import and foreign exchange controls. With an
eye in the stabilisation targets this latter course was adopted and from mid-1947 Brazil’s
foreign exchange regime was similar to the former regimes of 1931-1933 and 1937-1939
with the same political economy implications. It is frequently overlooked that it was part
of government policy to maintain untouched the level of gold reserves at US$ 342
million, equivalent to four months of imports at the 1947 level. However reluctantly
Brazil had finally entered the age of dollar shortage.
It is part  of ill-informed nearly unanimous historical judgement that the Dutra
administration irresponsibly squandered Brazil’s foreign reserves. Curiously enough these
claims are rarely accompanied by any condemnation of foreign exchange overvaluation
and no mention is made of the substantial size of gold reserves after 1947. A closer look4
at the figures also points out to the fact that there was not such a drastic change in the
structure of imports in 1946 if compared to the past, especially if pent-up demand is duly
taken into account: the share of imports of consumer goods in total imports rose from
16.9% in 1938 to 21.7% in 1946. However, to Brazilians used to extreme scarcity of
foreign exchange since the early 1930’s the much higher level of imports after 1945 and
the availability of foreign consumer goods seemed  slightly indecent. It is indeed difficult
to overestimate the strength of the anti-import sentiment fostered by foreign exchange
scarcity years after 1930. It is thus full of irony that the re-adoption of import substitution
policies was a direct result of the crucial position of stabilisation in the priorities of
‘liberal’ policy-makers in the immediate post-war period. Import controls stimulated the
import substitution of non-essential products, since the main rationing criterion was to
favour essential imports so that imports of luxury goods tended to be relatively more
affected than imports of capital goods or inputs. The share of consumer goods imports
was reduced and that corresponding to capital goods increased. After the introduction of
import controls there was a modest  reduction of total imports not exceeding 10% until
1950. More importantly, there was a sharp substitution of imports originating in the dollar
area by imports from non-dollar areas so that the deficit in the balance of payments with
the dollar area was reversed. The fall of almost 12% in the price of imports also helped
the government to regain control of the external accounts.
There is no study on the extent to which access to cheap imports enhanced the
profits of importers of domestic manufacturers or were passed through to consumers. The
relative prices of agricultural (food prices) and industrial goods rose increased rapidly by
more than 40% between 1945 and 1948 and then hovered around the same level until the
early 1960’s. It is likely that more market power in certain branches of industry ended up
by being reflected in the rise of relative prices of such goods in relation to those produced
in more competitive sectors which were forced to transfer lower input costs to consumers
.
Since the nominal level of the exchange rate remained constant from 1939 to
1952 inflation tended to erode the profit margins of exporters when export prices did not
rise sharply as was the case of coffee. The long cycle which affected coffee prices was in
the upswing after 1947 as world demand recovered and supply was constrained. Average
coffee prices (Santos 4) increased from 22.6 US cents in 1948 to 27.4 in 1949 and 49.55
cents in 1950. It then remained between 49.5 and 53.8 cents in 1951-1953, before
reaching 78.8 cents in 1954. The share of coffee exports in total exports which had
reached a level under or around a third in 1940-1945 rose rapidly to reach more than 70%
in 1952-1953. What had been considered export diversification had been indeed mostly a
change in the relative prices between coffee and other Brazilian exports. Once coffee
prices recovered, dependence on coffee exports was again evident. Since the United
States was the main coffee market for Brazil the US market absorbed a growing share of
Brazilian total exports: in 1950 this reached 54.3%, only lower than that of 1941, when
almost all other leading traditional markets were closed to Brazilian exports.
Brazilian foreign exchange policy based on overvaluation contributed to
strengthen coffee prices at least in the short term. Exports of products included in official
procurement programmes during the war such as quartz, castor beans, diamonds,
carnauba wax  and processed beef collapsed after 1945. The same happened to exports
which had benefited from the interruption of exports by traditional suppliers, such as
cotton textiles and rubber products. In contrast with the decline in such non-traditional
exports which was due to sudden changes in world demand, commodity exports other
than coffee suffered with overvaluation. Such exports, of which cotton is the best
example towards the end of the 1940’s, became ‘gravosas’, that is production costs
exceeded possible revenue levels given world commodity prices and the fixed exchange
rate. The government had to resort to earmarked ‘operations’ [‘operações vinculadas’] to
ease pressure from producers, especially those of cotton. Through these expedients the
government would serve as a broker between those exporters seeking better terms for
their exports and importers who were prepared to pay more per unit of foreign currency
to import goods which were not considered to be essential by the import control
authorities. While the macroeconomic relevance of the scale of corruption in the
allocation of foreign exchange cover tends to be exaggerated by some analysts it is
obvious that government rationing through import  controls and brokering in earmarked
‘operations’ created opportunities for corrupt practices in government.
Criticisms of the unfavourable effects of the overvalued exchange rate on exports
need to be put into perspective since in many European markets for some time after the
war export sales did not necessarily contribute to increase the capacity to import as6
currencies were inconvertible and exports were in many cases constrained by stiff export
controls in most European markets.
Perhaps the best example of such asymmetries is the accumulation of sterling
balances in Britain. From the end of the war in Europe to the beginning of 1947 Brazil
continued to supply Britain under the terms of the Anglo-Brazilian payments agreement
of 1940 which made sterling accumulated in London unconvertible. So sterling balances
increased from £40 million in V-E day to about £65 million by mid-1947. Neves da
Fontoura, the Foreign Minister, made a visit to Britain in 1946 to seek British permission
to use and misleadingly reported that the British were likely to agree that the balances
would be used to buy ships and other capital goods for which there was pent-up demand
in Brazil. It was a corollary of the agreement between Britain and the United States on
British post-war finance that Britain refused to pay these debts out of current scarce
export capacity. In spite of much British pressure Brazil refused to scale down its
balances. As a preliminary to the failed British return to convertibility in mid-1947 the
sterling balance holders were told that pre-convertibility balances would be frozen and
only thawed in exchange for a comprehensive programme of sale of British assets
involving mainly the railways.  This took a long time and in fact there was some release
of blocked sterling as an inducement for certain railway purchases of whose the most
important were those of the very efficient San Paolo Railway and the rather inefficient
Leopoldina. The remaining balances were used in a sudden redemption of Brazilian
foreign debt in 1950 during a scare about a possible unilateral scale down of balances by
Britain. While British direct investment was reduced by at least US$ 165 million between
1938 and 1950 there was a rapid expansion of US investment which increased from US$
323 million in 1946 to US$ 644 million in 1950 of which US$ 284 million in
manufacturing industry, US$ 112 million in oil distribution, US$ 138 million in utilities
and US$ 110 million in other investments. While investments in utilities were practically
stagnant, other investments had increased more than 2.5 fold in these four years.
Comparison with balance of payments data suggest that more than US$ 200 million of
the increase in 1946-1950 corresponded to new capital and the rest to reinvestment. Data
on foreign investment other than British or from the US for the 1940’s are notoriously
defective and the semi-official estimates for direct investment in consequence somewhat
inflated: it is hard to believe that in 1945 these investments made up half the capital stock
of foreign capital.7
The overvalued exchange rate resulted in a disincentive to new direct foreign
investment implied as purchases of domestic goods and services would be relatively more
expensive. There was also an inducement to maximise profit remittances. But the
handicaps seem to have been compensated by potentially significant rent-seeking
extraction in relation to both access to rationed imports of capital goods and inputs and
exertion of market power in a market where protection against imports was made
absolute by the prohibitions enacted by exchange control authorities.
Inflationary pressures were enhanced in 1946 by the significant impact of a pay
rise to civil servants agreed by Gastão Vidigal, Dutra’s first finance minister. This added
more fuel to the impact of a significant rise in import prices so that inflation measured by
the cost of living in 1946 remained above 16%, at the same level of 1945. With Correa e
Castro as a new finance minister in late 1946, stabilisation returned to the top of the
priority list and public expenditure was tightly controlled so that for the first time since
the Old Republic there was a small fiscal surplus at the Federal level in 1947. In contrast,
the deficit at the state level, especially in São Paulo and the Federal District, was very
substantial, corresponding to 10-15% of their expenditures. This proved to be impossible
to control, in spite of some progress in 1948, and did not fall below 4.5% of total
expenditure. Banking credit which had been reduced by 10% in 1946 remained roughly
constant in 1947-1949. Inflation   measured by the wholesale pricesstarted to decrease in
1947 but the consumer price yearly rate (Rio de Janeiro) peaked at 21.9% in 1947, as
there was a sharp fall in agricultural output, before falling to 3-4% yearly in 1948-1949.
Following the political cycle which would doom many future stabilisation efforts,
the emphasis of government policy on stabilisation lost all appeal as the elections of
October 1950 became closer. By mid-1949 Correa e Castro was substituted by Guilherme
da Silveira, a textile industrialist who favoured easy credit and fiscal policies. Increased
public expenditure both by the Federal government and by the states in 1949-1950
reflected such a shift in policy. By 1950, the Federal deficit had reached almost 20% of
the expenditures and was about twice the size of the aggregate deficit at state level.
Lobbies in favour of looser policies were extremely powerful, including those seeking
credit from the Bank of Brazil to profit from the industrial boom and populist politicians
seeking to build up their political fiefs in the rapidly expanding urban areas. In 1950, real8
credit increased in real terms by more than 20% only then exceeding its 1945 level. Thus
in 1945-1950 real credit per unit of GDP was reduced by 25% in spite of the reversal of
policy in the last eighteen months of Dutra’s government. Difficulties were compounded
by the bad crop of 1950, so that inflation measured   by consumer prices in Rio de Janeiro
started to accelerate again in 1950 reaching more than 9%.
Perhaps the most important failure of the Dutra administration was its inability to
engage in a significant effort to overhaul the ailing existing infrastructure and expand
capacity. Many Brazilian ships had been sunk during the war.  Foreign exchange scarcity
and supply constraints as well as low profits by utilities in 1930’s and early 1940’s not
only made new investment impossible but also explained the deterioration of existing
capacity in railways, electricity, telephones and railroads, owned either by the
government or foreign concerns. Brazil had hoped that good behaviour during the war
was going to be repaid with economic aid. But in 1946 it had already become clear that
Brazil could no count on any special help from the United States. It was explicit US
policy that the inflow of capital into Brazil should basically depend on Brazil’s capacity
to attract private direct investment rather than on any direct involvement by the US
government. Limited finance was extended through some Export and Import Bank loans
mainly to state enterprises to buy ships and also railway and electric equipment. The
International Bank for Reconstruction extended a substantial loan to the Canadian-owned
Brazilian Traction group which supplied electricity to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.
Approved loans to Brazil added up to 11% of total International Bank loans in 1947-
1950. But there was no Brazilian version of a Marshall Plan as expected by the
government.
Efforts by the Brazilian government to plan the modernisation of infrastructure
were embodied in the SALTE plan, whose name derived from the initials of the sectoral
targets considered to be most important: health, food, transportation and energy. Salte
also means an imperative ‘jump’in Portuguese. It is not unreasonable to think that the
first two ‘sectors’ were included due to a mixture of  political convenience, as the social
aspect had to be addressed, with the need for particular letters to give to the plan what
was considered to be an attractive name which could mobilise political support for the
government’s programme of infrastructure construction. There were no comparable
policies proposed for health and food supply. But the government’s efforts were to be of9
no avail, a crucial weakness of the Dutra government, to some extent shared by its
successors, being its inability to assure political support in Congress. The SALTE plan
was only approved by Congress in the last year of  Dutra’s term of office only to be
abandoned by the new administration in 1951.
Progress in the improvement of social indicators in the 1940’s was modest. In
1950 the infant mortality rate was still 144.7 per thousand live births (199 in Rio Grande
do Norte and 99 in Rio Grande do Sul. Reduction of the shortcomings of infant mortality
rates in relation to benchmark values of 10 deaths per thousand live births was of only
around 10% in the decade. The literacy rate in 1950 was only 48.4% (44.2% for women)
and improvement of literacy rates in relation to the benchmark of 100% progressed also
at the low rate of 10% for the whole decade.
Political obstacles also made it impossible to approve new tax legislation
proposed by the government, so that adjustment had to rely relatively more on
expenditure control than would have been the case if the tax reform had been approved.
Federal revenue depended essentially on the consumption and income taxes as import
duties continued to lose importance due to the impact of inflation on the specific tariff.
By 1950 the share of the consumption tax in total revenue was 34.4%, but the share of
income tax was rapidly approaching it, to reach 30%.
The direct US government co-operation to solve the problems raised by the
finance of economic development projects in Brazil was restricted to the efforts, in 1948,
of a Comissão Técnica Mista Brasil-Estados Unidos [Joint Brazil-United States
Technical Commission], generally known as the Abbink 1948 mission. Its report was
marked by a deep pessimism about the prospects of Brazilian export prices which proved
to be entirely misplaced at least in the mid-term. The emphasis was on the need to attract
foreign capital and to assure that domestic savings were directed away from
overinvestment in real estate. A few days before the Abbink report was presented
Brazilian hopes had been raised by the reorientation in US policy entailed by point IV of
the speech of President Truman in his inauguration which emphasised the importance of
making US technical knowledge available to developing economies. There was finally
hope of US government involvement in the long list of delayed infrastructural projects in
Brazil. A Comissão Mista Brasil-Estados Unidos para o Desenvolvimento Econômico10
[Joint Brazil-United States Economic Development Commission] was formed in the end
of 1950 with the task of defining projects which could be submitted either to the Export
and Import Bank or the International Bank for Reconstruction .
Although the previous government’s institutional creative furore was brought
under relative control, some new agencies were created and government involvement was
increased in several sectors. In an indirect recognition of the difficulties related to the
operation of foreign-owned electricity suppliers the Federal government decided to get
involved in the production of hydro-electricity in the Northeast with the project of  Paulo
Afonso and the creation of Companhia Hidroelétrica do São Francisco (CHESF) [São
Francisco Hydroeletric Company]. The other important decision concerning energy
matters taken by the Dutra administration was related to oil refining. The debate on
public ownership of  the different segments of the oil industry had become increasingly
partisan since oil had been found by the government in 1939. Pressure by the big
international oil companies for a share of the Brazilian prospective oil production and
refining had been mounting. The government allowed a couple of small projects owned
by Brazilian firms to go ahead while no overall decision was reached on the role of the
government and private capital in all segments of the oil industry.
The importance of regional imbalances was recognised by the creation of the first
regional development agencies, the Comissão do Vale do São Francisco [São Francisco
Valley Commission] and the Superintendência do Plano de Valorização Econômica da
Amazônia [Superintendency of the Plan for the Economic Valorization of the Amazon
Region]. A Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas [National Research Council] was created by
Dutra in the closing month of his term of office. Its inspiration was centred more on the
wish of the military to foster Brazil’s knowledge of the possibilities opened by nuclear
power than on a diagnosis that research would have to play a significantly more important
role as a stimulus to economic development than in the past.
Vargas came out of his self-imposed isolation, in spite of being a senator,  to win
the 1950 elections. His alleged true electoral manifesto was to be a combination of
policies first in the style of Campos Salles, and then of Rodrigues Alves. In the Brazilian
political folklore, Campos Salles had given political backing to Joaquim Murtinho in
1898-1902 to put the Republican finances in order after the turmoil in the 1890’s and11
Rodrigues Alves had undertaken a vast post-stabilisation programme of public works. In
fact Alves also placed stabilization at the top of his list of priorities.  But already in the
selection of his economic team Vargas was unable to clearly choose stabilisation as the
initial main objective.. The rather orthodox policies adopted by Horácio Lafer in the
Ministry of Finance, which generated Federal budget surpluses 0.9% and 0.6% of the
GDP in 1951 and 1952, have to be contrasted by the extremely expansionary credit
policies adopted by Ricardo Jafet in the Bank of Brazil. The potential for friction between
the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Brazil would be a recurrent theme in the history
of failed stabilisation attempts during the Third republic. Jafet had been the man in
charge of the financing of Vargas’ election and was not known for his endorsement of
orthodox economic policies: Bank of Brazil credit to the private sector in nominal terms
increased 66% in 1951 and 40% in 1952. Total banking credit in real terms increased by
13.7% and 8.7% in these years. Other developments put the government under pressure.
The 1951 crop for domestic consumption was a not a success. Import US dollar prices
increased almost 30% in 1951 and 8% more in 1952. The lack of Federal control on
overspending by the state of São Paulo continued to be another major obstacle to the
implementation of a coherent stabilisation programme. Between 1951 and 1952 the
deficit by States and municipalities increased from 0.5% to 1.5% of GDP. The cost of
living rate rose  17.3%. The high rate of increase in agricultural output in 1952 was
mainly due to an important increase in cotton production but the crop for domestic
consumption was still . Inflation measured by the cost of living rose in 1951 to 12.1%
then to 17.3% in 1952.  In  1953 pressures on the exchange rate which eventually led to
an overhaul of the regime adopted since 1947 led, in spite of a recovery in food
production, to an acceleration of inflation after a slight fall in 1953 to an yearly rate of
14.3% in 1953. In  1954-1956 inflation rates were around 21-23%.
The institutional arrangement between SUMOC, the Treasury, and the Bank of
Brazil acting as a central bank was extremely peculiar and was repeatedly used to assure
that there was no restriction to the growth of operations by the Bank of Brazil. SUMOC
fixed the rediscount rate and the rates of compulsory deposit of commercial banks besides
other functions related to the foreign exchange policy , the registration of foreign
investment and the supervision of the banking system operations. It had a council which
acted as the normative body in matters related to money, credit and foreign exchange.
The Bank of Brazil operated the Carteira de Redescontos-CARED [Rediscount Office]12
and the Caixa de Mobilização Bancária-CAMOB [Banking Mobilisation Office] so as to
provide liquidity or to act as a lender of last resort. The Treasury had the legal
authorisation to issue money and amortise it through a Caixa de Amortização
[Amortisation Office] . But it could not put it in circulation which was an attribution of
CARED.
When in need of cash the Bank of Brazil would rediscount commercial papers
with CARED which would require a loan from the Treasury. When the commercial
papers matured the Bank would return the cash to CARED which would be return it to the
Treasury for incineration by the Caixa de Amortização. There had been since 1942 a
theoretical limitation of short term indebtedness of CARED with the Treasury which
could not exceed 25% of foreign reserves. But it was not binding as a long-term
limitation as each time CARED exceeded the limit there a law was passed by Congress
which determined that money in circulation should be ‘taken over’ by the Treasury with
all debits of CARED, Bank of Brazil and the Treasury being cancelled out. A second
carefully preserved loophole in the relation of the Bank of Brazil with the monetary
authorities before 1964 was that being a commercial bank it also held the compulsory
deposits of the other commercial banks with the monetary authorities. Since the Bank of
Brazil made no distinction between his functions as a central bank and as a commercial
bank part of the banking system reserves served as a basis for its own increased loans and
advances.
Once again the stabilisation priority would be the main explanation for decisions
which crucially affected the country’s balance of payments. From the first year of
Vargas’government in 1951 it was decided that an increased supply of imports was a
required ingredient of a successful stabilisation programme. This resulted in a significant
liberalisation of import controls, with a big increase in the import licenses issued. It was
this change of policy, rather than the Korean boom, that was at the root of the foreign
exchange crisis which marked the early 1950’s. With the nominal exchange rate still at
the 1946 level, imports of around  US$ 1,700 million in 1951-1952 were more than 80%
higher than in 1950, a substantial rise even if  prices had increased 40%. The US share of
the Brazilian market, which had been steadily declining, recovered to levels above 40%
in the early 1950’s. Exports continued to increase in 1951: they were 30% higher than in
1950, reaching US$ 1,771 million, but fell to barely more than US$ 1.4 billion in 1952.13
The traditional trade surplus almost disappeared in 1951 and was transformed into a trade
deficit of almost US$ 300 million in 1952. Such an import boom led to the accumulation
of commercial arrears of US$ 541 million at the end of 1952, with the Federal
government very reluctant about using the gold reserves to pay for imports. The position
was made even more serious due to the time lag between the issue of licenses and actual
imports as it became clear that there had been an overshooting and too many licenses had
been issued.
The Brazilian government sought financial accommodation in the United States
to finance the thawing of these commercial arrears. The timing was unfortunate since the
Republican victory in November 1952 had resulted in the weakening in the position of
Eximbank in its fight with the World Bank for the Brazilian turf. In a speech in the end of
1951 Vargas had sharply criticised the practice of allowing the registration of unmerited
profits by foreign corporations as foreign reinvestment which could be used as an
additional basis to remit future profits. This declaration, is seen by some as a typical ruse
by Vargas, trying to use his future return to good behaviour as a negotiating chip in the
negotiations to extract a loan from the United States. It naturally raised strong protests
abroad, including from the World Bank which had been trying since the end of the 1940’s
to avoid the erosion of its leverage in Brazil by restricting Eximbank activities to short or
mid-term loans. The temporary rise in World Bank influence meant that Brazil, after
adjustments in its foreign exchange regime was able to obtain a US$ 300 million loan
from Eximbank  to be repaid in three years and with no grace period. With the
Republican victory there was also a reversal of US policy on project finance in
developing countries with the abandonment of Trumans’s Point IV policy. It became
clear that no additional US official finance would be available for projects selected by the
Comissão Mista Brasil-Estados Unidos. The commercial arrears bailout in any case made
it unlikely that the US would enter into additional financial commitments in Brazil.  Total
US loans for approved CMBEU projects amounted to US$ 186 million only. The
comprehensive overhaul of the infrastructure would have to be once again postponed.
Brazil’s total foreign debt which had been slowly reduced from US$ 698 million by the
end of 1945 to US$ 559 million by the end of 1950 rose to US$ 1,317 million by the end
of 1954. But the debt-export ratio was still very low: it reached a minimum of  0.32 by
the end of 1951 and increased to 0.85 by the end of 1954.14
The deterioration in the external accounts led to a reform of the exchange regime
in early 1953. Law 1807 also met partially the sharp criticisms to the old policy raised in
the United States. The new foreign exchange regime was a next of kin of that of 1935-
1937. Two exchange rates were pegged by the government: one more devalued was the
free rate, the other was the official rate. Exporters of coffee, cotton and cocoa would be
paid the official rate. Other exporters, at the discretion of the authorities, would sell
compulsorily 15%, 30% or 50% of export proceeds at the official rate. Almost all
financial transactions used the free rate as well all non-essential imports which amounted
to about a third of total imports. Other purchases of foreign exchange were to be made at
the official rate. The registration of unremitted  profits as reinvestment was duly allowed.
Ricardo Jafet, who not only had undermined the stabilisation effort by adopting
expansionary credit policies in the Bank of Brazil, but had also supported Vargas’
unfortunate line on reinvestment of foreign capital, was sacked in the beginning of 1953
in the wake of scandals involving the ‘operações vinculadas’. This came too late as
stabilisation seemed doomed even before the impact of devaluation. Exports had not
reacted to incentives provided in the new foreign exchange regime. In the first half of
1953 there were indications of lack of control with increased expenditure to cope with the
effects of the dry season in the Northeast, to bail out state banks, to pay a civil service
wage increase and to proceed with the public works programme. Vargas faced political
defeat in the city of São Paulo elections and political agitation led to a massive strike in
March in São Paulo. Lafer was substituted in mid-1953 by Oswaldo Aranha.
Aranha proceeded to change once again the foreign exchange regime. New rules
allowed the sale in the free market of 50% of the proceeds of all exports with the
exception of coffee. Minimum export prices were established and export proceeds
beyond these thresholds could be entirely sold in the free market. But in spite of lip
service concerning the control of  the public deficit the government continued without
instruments to raise additional resources.
Aranha’s more permanent reform of the exchange regime tried to remove at the
same time the constraints imposed by the balance of payments and by public finance.
Instrução 70 of SUMOC of October 1953 introduced a system of  ‘ágios e bonificações’,
taking as reference the official rate of Cr$ 18.32/$US dollar declared to the International15
Monetary Fund. Coffee exports would receive an extra payment,  a ‘bonificação’ of Cr$
5.00/US$ dollar; non-coffee exports would receive Cr$ 10.00/$US dollar. A new paper,
‘promessa de venda de câmbio’ [promise to sell foreign exchange] , was created. These
were to be auctioned and gave the right to the purchaser to buy foreign exchange. There
were five different categories of auctions for imports, classified according to
“essentiality”. The authorities distributed discretionary foreign exchange as between
different import category auction. About 80% of total allocated exchange was reserved to
categories I to III and only 3% to category V of luxury goods. Certain special imports
such as newsprint and wheat paid only the official rate. Oil imports as well government
or state enterprise imports paid a surtax on the official rate. The result was that on
average, for instance in 1953, the cost of imports per unit of foreign exchange varied
between Cr$ 18.82 and 78.90. Category V rate was 2.5 times the category I rate. The
system acted as a substitute for tariffs as the Brazilian specific tariff schedule  had been
badly eroded by inflation. A ‘free’ rate applied to financial transactions.
The government could use the wedge between the average import rate and the
average export rate as a fiscal instrument. But this was too little to cope with increased
expenditure, especially transfers to the State of São Paulo. The deficit of states and
municipalities fell only very slowly after 1953 to reach 0.9% in 1954. In spite of Jafet’s
replacement in the Bank of Brazil loans by the bank increased 36% in 1953. In 1953 the
income tax had become the main Federal tax  (32.6% of total revenue), marginally more
important than the consumption tax (30.2%). By the end of 1953 all the fundamentals
concerning fiscal , monetary and credit policies pointed to the failure of stabilisation. To
this must be added the inflationary consequences of the rise in import prices caused by
Instrução 70 which were in addition to those related to Law 1807. Inflation rates in 1954
were above 20% measured by the cost of living index.
Exports recovered very modestly in 1953 and 1954 in answer to changes in
foreign exchange policy. They reached a peak of US$ 1,771 million in 1951 and then fell
to around US$ 1.4-1.5 billion until 1957. There was a very substantial additional increase
in coffee prices from a level of around 55-56 US$ cents per pound in the first semester of
1953 to 62 cents in the end of the year rising to almost US$ 1.00 in June 1954. This was
due to a frost in Paraná and difficulties in competitive suppliers. A political campaign in
the US led to a contraction in consumption while the Brazilian government established16
minimum export prices. In the final months of Vargas’ government export volumes were
very low. In the middle of August the government finally decided to improve the
conditions applying to the purchase of coffee export proceeds by allowing 20% of these
proceeds to be sold at the much more devalued ‘free’ rate. Prices eased and there was
some recovery in export volumes but they remained much below normal levels. The
value of imports fell in 1953 to US$ 1.1 billion, recovered in 1954 to US$ 1.4 billion but
this was the only year in the 1953-1964 period when it was not roughly between US$ 1.1
and US$ 1.3 billion. There was, however, a fall in import prices 1953-1954 of about 10%
and a further fall of almost 15% until 1960. The decline in the US position as a major
supplier to Brazil continued but it was still the major supplier in mid-1950’s holding
around a third of the market. The bad performance of exports is the main explanation for
the permanent constraint on imports which would be one the most import obstacles faced
by policy-makers in Brazil during the 1950’s.
Difficulties faced by Aranha in the second quarter of 1954 were compounded by
Vargas decision to double the minimum wage which added up to inflationary pressures
even if it is considered that a substantial rise was required only to maintain the previous
real wage peak in real terms. In 1952 the minimum wage had been increased 212% after
a long period without adjustment since 1944 which led to a real fall of almost 55%. The
increase was proposed by Goulart, the Labour minister, and adopted by the President in
spite of strong opposition by Aranha. Typically, Vargas fired Goulart in sacrifice to his
critics.
There was a new wave of creation of governmental, or government-controlled,
institutions during Vargas’ second government of which, retrospectively, the most
important were Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico-BNDE [National
Economic Development Bank] and Petróleo Brasileiro-Petrobrás [Brazilian Oil]. BNDE
was created in 1952 as a financial counterpart to the Comissão Mista Brasil-Estados
Unidos. It was thus at the origin essentially a public-owned bank concerned with
infrastructural projects. Later in the 1950’s it became an important source of finance for
projects which aimed at the import substitution of basic inputs. Petrobrás was vested with
a far-reaching government monopoly which covered all aspects of oil production and
processing. Only in distribution activities there was scope for the continued operations of
the big foreign firms.  Debate on the nature of government intervention in the oil industry17
was marked by strong political mobilisation, particularly in the armed forces which were
split by the issue. While victory of the ‘o petróleo é nosso’ [oil is ours] campaign has
become emblematic of a strategy based on state-controlled institution it is a matter for the
record that, strangely enough, the comprehensive monopoly approved by Congress was a
result of an initiative by the opposition to Vargas. Legislation initially proposed by the
government provided for a less comprehensive span of monopoly activities. Taken jointly
with the evidence on the establishment of Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional and
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce the circumstances surrounding the foundation of Petrobras
suggest a much less comprehensive effort by Vargas to build up public ownership in
strategic sectors than is frequently taken for granted. The Federal government
institutional building included the establishment of a Fundo Federal de Eletrificação
[Federal Electrification Fund] and the creation of the embryo of a holding to control
federal-owned electricity companies, Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras-Eletrobrás [Brazilian
Electric Power Stations], which would activated after 1961 when it would have control
over the big Federal-owned electricity generation companies, of which only CHESF was
operating in the early 1950’s. The government also established a Comissão Executiva do
Plano do Carvão Nacional [Executive Commission of the National Coal Plan] to cope
with the problems raised by the absorption of low-quality coal produced in the South
mainly through the construction of coal-burning thermoelectrical plants.
Vargas’ suicide and its succession by the centre-right vice-president, Café Filho,
created the conditions for a return of the 1945 ‘liberals’ to economic policy-making. But
the political conditions required for a serious attempt at stabilisation did not exist as
Gudin, the new Finance Minister and leading conservative economist, would discover
after only seven months in office. Interest rates were increased. And credit was squeezed
by a steep increase in the compulsory deposits of banks in SUMOC. In 1954-1955 real
banking credit remained 7-8% below its recent peak in 1952-1953. Budget expenditures
were to be cut by 36%. Gudin’s position was undermined by his difficulties to obtain
political backing for expenditure cuts and also by Paulista objections to the low level of
the export bonus [‘bonificação’]  paid to coffee growers which only slightly higher than
that under the exchange regime inherited from Aranha .
It was possible, however, to renegotiate a big loan with private banks in the
United  States to extend the maturing repayment period of credits for commercial arrears18
which had been obtained under Vargas. This operation was guaranteed by US$ 300
million of reserves in gold, reversing a policy which had been adopted since 1947 on the
role of gold reserves. In relation to still another aspect of foreign economic policy, Gudin
was unwittingly responsible for an economic policy instrument which would be of vital
importance for the rest of the 1950’s as an incentive to foreign capital inflows and the
deepening of import substitution to reach more sophisticated branches of industry, in
particular transportation equipment. This was SUMOC’s instruction 113, which allowed
imports of capital goods without  exchange cover as direct foreign investment. Since
foreign investment  entered at the ‘free’ rate and exchange cover for imported capital
goods had to be purchased at the category 3 auction there was a subsidy to foreign
investment equivalent to the difference between the category 3 rate and the ‘free’ rate.
Different views on the distributive impact of instruction 113 to a large extent reflect the
comparison of such rates in different moments in time and consequently different relative
levels of the ‘free’and category 3 exchange rates.
A political deal between Jânio Quadros, the maverick governor of São Paulo, and
Café Filho involving the substitution of the president of the Banco do Brasil led to
Gudin’s substitution by Whitaker, who returned to the Ministry of Finance after 25 years,
once again representing the Paulista interests and especially those of coffee. Whitaker
reversed Gudin’s contractionary policies concerning credit and expenditure. His priority
was to reform the multiple exchange rate system which was considered to hurt export
interests and particularly those of coffee growers. Whitaker and Roberto Campos,
superintendent of BNDE, following IMF advice, thought that Brazil should accept lower
international coffee prices and increase market share and that the multiple exchange rate
should be abandoned in favour of a single rate. There were pre-conditions to fulfil
concerning consolidation of short-term foreign debt, a standby arrangement to avoid
excessive fluctuation of the new rate and adjustment of the tariff schedule to cope with
the removal of  multiple import rates. A new tariff schedule would solve one of the
problems raised by unification of the rates but IMF support would be essential to raise
finance abroad. A report, written by Edward Bernstein, an IMF official, considered
several alternatives for the new exchange regime. The Brazilian final draft proposed a
regime based on a single floating exchange rate. There would be a transitional regime
affecting coffee as the exchange rate applied to coffee would converge to the single rate
in a time span of two years ending the so-called ‘confisco cambial’[foreign exchange19
exaction]. Opposition in the ministry as well by presidential candidates led to Whitaker’s
fall even before the political collapse of the attempted coup by the ‘liberals’ in November
1955 and the successful ‘democratic’ countercoup which assured that the President elect,
Juscelino Kubitscheck, would take office in early 1956.
The difficulties faced by Gudin and Whitaker underline the kind of constraints
faced by ‘liberal economists’ in the formulation and implementation of a truly liberal
programme. Even Gudin, who rapidly exited from the Ministry of Finance due to its lack
of ‘political realism’ found it difficult to condemn the inherited multiple exchange regime
due to its fiscal implications. Whitaker’s nominal commitment to liberalism was
essentially marred by his political backing which made it impossible to consider policies
which would unfavourably affect coffee interests.
The growth record in the 1945-1955 period was impressive, with GDP expanding
at 7.1%. The record under Dutra was slightly better than in the first half of the 1950’s
with the economy growing at 7.6% yearly, in spite of the recession in 1947 when the
yearly rate fell to 2.4%. In the two worse years under Vargas, 1951 and 1953, in spite of
the difficulties concerning stabilisation, GDP increased at almost 5% yearly. However,
population growth, which in the 1940’s was at 2.4% a year compared to 1.5% in 1920-
1940, increased to 3.0% in the 1950’s. So the improved GDP growth record was rather
less satisfactory on a per capita basis.
Industrial output (manufacturing industry after 1947) increased at 9.8% yearly in
1945-1955, more rapidly under Dutra because of the very significant growth in 1946 as
part of the recovery immediately after the war. In contrast agricultural output growth was
slow at 3.9% and more so under Dutra when it increased at the rate of 2.7% only.  But the
performance of subsistence agriculture in 1945-1950 was good with the output of rice and
beef increasing at more than 8% yearly and corn and beans at more than 4%. But in spite
of this, and in contrast with the 1930’s, there was no significant contraction of the share
of agriculture in GDP as agricultural relative prices rose in relation to industrial products.
Employment in agriculture as a share of the active population fell from 65.9% in 1939 to
57.8% in 1949. The share of industry rose from 20.8% to 24.1% mostly at the expense of
services. Industrial output structures in 1939 and 1949 were not radically different as the
share of the textile sector in total value of production decreased only 2 percentage points20
to reach 18.7%.But the relative contraction of most other sectors producing wage goods
was substantial. Sectors producing industrial inputs, such as steel and iron products, as
well as consumer durables and to a lesser extent capital goods, gained some ground.
There is evidence, however, that structural change accelerated in the first half of the
1950s as import substitution spread to the production of most consumer durable goods. In
1949, the textile industry was still almost three times the size of the metallurgical
industry. The textile sector combined with food processing answered for more than half
the aggregate value of production  compared to 56.8% in 1939 and 62.5% in 1919. The
value of production of more modern sectors – electrical, mechanical and transport
equipment  – was 5.3% of the total in 1949 compared to 4.2% in 1939 and 1.3% in 1919.
The productivity of labour engaged in manufacturing industry as of the census of 1949
fell to 4.7 times the productivity in agriculture compared to 5 times in 1939. The ratio of
imports in total supply of industrial products, which reached a trough of 11.2% in 1942-
1943, rose to a peak to 18-20% with the import boom in 1951-1952, and then started to
fall rapidly: in 1955 it was already below 10%.
2. The golden years: 1956-1962
President Kubitschek had an initial choice between a stabilisation programme
inspired by  Edward Bernstein of the IMF and promoted by his more orthodox supporters
such as Lucas Lopes and Roberto Campos. But it was politically expedient to stick to an
overtly expansionary policy with J.M. Alkmin as a Finance Minister. However, the year
of 1956 was for most purposes a transitional year as the government concentrated in
drawing its plans. But the imbalances in public accounts increased significantly as the
Treasury’s cash deficit increased from 13.6% of expenditures in 1955 (around 1% of
GDP ) to 32.2% ( around 2.6% of GDP ) and GDP growth was only 2.9% as there was a
significant crop failure. Inflation remained above 20% as measured by the cost of living
in Rio.
The cornerstone of the President’s economic programme was the Programa de
Metas [Target Programme] which would allow the Brazilian economy  to grow fifty years
during the  five years of his term of office [50 anos em cinco]. This was to cope both with
the business of overhauling the infrastructure, left unfinished by Dutra and Vargas, and
with the deepening of import substitution to cover the remaining consumer durables,21
mainly motor cars, and industrial inputs. Also important, both as a drain in public
resources, and as a project to mobilise political support, was the building of Brasília, with
its implied national integration emphasis crowning a long of process of not very
elaborated criticism of the concentration of expenditure and political power in the
coastline in detriment of the hinterland.
Formulation of the Plan, heavily inspired in the previous work of the CMBEU, as
well as on studies undertaken by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America, was the result of work by the Conselho de Desenvolvimento [Development
Council], a new agency directly under the President. The Conselho orchestrated a large
number of grupos executivos [executive groups]  in charge of specific targets. There was
no global macroeconomic framework coherent with physical targets mostly related to the
infrastructure or to the industrial sector. There was also no attempt to define how the
projects were going to be financed. Details started to be defined in the third year of the
plan’s implementation. Nor was there any special consideration of inter-industry
implications of the planned increase in capacity. Major infrastructural targets referred to
expansion between 1955 and 1960 of the road network (construction of 13,000 Km of
roads and paving of 5,800 Km, compared to existing 460,000 Km and 3,100 Km,
respectively) as also of railroads (construction of 3,100 Km, compared to the existing
37,000 Km). New industries producing rolling stock and ships were to be established.
Energy targets covered increases in electricity generating capacity (from 3.2 MW to 5.2
MW), oil production (from 6,000 barrels to 100,000 barrels/day), oil refining (from
130,000 to 300,000 barrels/day) and  coal production (from 2.1 to 3.1 million tons).
Government plans concerning the infrastructure were based on the recognition
that the old model of  energy utilities controlling power generation, transmission and
distribution had been exhausted as exchange rate fluctuations had enormously increased
the friction between such companies and the government  and led to underinvestment.
This explains the expansion of public involvement in the generation and transmission of
electricity partly based on expertise accumulated by CEMIG, the  rather efficient
electricity company owned by the state of Minas Gerais. On the other hand, there was
also the implicit recognition that the State would be unable to efficiently run the railway
system so that at the planning stage, and even more during implementation of the
Programa de Metas, it was apparent that the government had opted for the significant22
expansion and improvement of the road network in detriment of a serious overhauling of
the railway system. In fact, most of the government efforts concerning the railways was
centred on the transformation of locomotives to oil burning sin spite of the unfavourable
effects on its plans to increase the production of high-ash high- sulphur domestic coal.
There was also complementarity between plans related to the expansion of the road
infrastructure and the target to produce domestically trucks and light commercial
vehicles. The road versus rail competition which had become evident in the second half
of the 1920’s was going to be decisively won by the road in the second half of the 1950’s.
Planned increased production of inputs included steel production (1.2 million to
2.3 million tons of steel), cement production (3.6 million to 5.0 million tons), chemical
products, non-ferrous metals and cellulose. Iron ore output mainly for export was to be
expanded. An automotive industry was to be established which would produce in 1960
170,000 vehicles with a crudely defined index of nationalisation by weight set at 95% for
motor cars and 90% for trucks and vans. Industrial subsectors producing capital goods
(heavy electrical equipment, machine tools, boilers and other heavy equipment) were
singled out to be supported. Agriculture was covered rather incompletely by targets for
tractors, fertilisers and wheat production. There was some nominal reference to education
but again more as the lip service to make the plan politically more palatable.
State investment was to play a crucial role in the plan, especially in the targets
related to infrastructure and the production of industrial inputs. There was a further
expansion in the role of the State as a producer of goods with an increase in the number
and importance of state enterprises. The share of government and government enterprises
rose from around 25% of total investment before 1956 to a third in 1956-1960. The
construction of two new integrated steel mills Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais-
Usiminas Minas Gerais Steel Mills and Companhia Siderúrgica Paulista-Cosipa
[Paulista Steel Mills] was started. Petrobrás was in charge of the  targets related to oil
production and refining, given the legal state monopoly. It also increased its fleet of
tankers. There was significant public investment in the construction of new state-owned
hydroelectric plants in the Southeast. Vale do Rio Doce was to continue its expansion to
become a major world producer of iron ore. Companhia Nacional de Álcalis would
become an important producer of soda ash.23
Interest of the private sector, and especially of direct foreign investment, was
raised by the concession of comprehensive incentives which covered special fiscal
treatment, credit subsidies -- mostly related to loans extended by BNDE --, and import
duty exemptions. Since inflation remained most of the time above 12% and the usury law
continued to be applied to obtain public credit was equivalent to obtain a stream of
subsidies in the future. Private banks would not be involved in credit operations which
were not short-term and were able to circumvent legal restraints by expedients such as
fictitious administrative costs or by tying loan concession to the holding of deposits to
compensate them for the negative real rates of interests implied by legislation in an
environment marked by significant inflation. Implicit subsidies related to non-indexed
Bank of Brazil loans are estimated to have varied in the 1956-1961 period between a low
of 35% of the Treasury deficit in 1957 to a peak of 151% of the Treasury deficit in 1959.
Bank of Brazil credit corresponded over the 1952-1961 period to between 48% and 53%
of total credit with a slow declining trend after 1959. Credit by BNDE in the 1950’s
peaked in 1958 when it was equivalent to about 4% of total banking credit. BNDE played
an additional crucial role which was to guarantee foreign loans contracted abroad by
Brazilian enterprises totalling US$ 890 million.
By far the most important instrument used by the government to attract foreign
capital was Instrução 113 of SUMOC. After an initial period under the multiple exchange
rate regime when the ‘free’ rate (applied to financial flows) was higher (cruzeiro/US
dollar) than that applied to category  3 imports (capital goods) the position was reversed
and the free rate remained in 1955-1957 below that of category 3 imports. There was thus
a subsidy for capital entering the country in the form of equipment under Instrução 113 if
compared to the alternative of entering as a financial flow and then competing for foreign
exchange cover in the exchange auctions. After 1957 subsidy was to be assured by the
free rate remaining below the ‘general’ import exchange rate. Exports reached a peak in
1951 and afterwards began a long process of decline. The peak of 1951 would only be
exceeded in 1968. The use of other instruments to generate foreign exchange such as
merchandise imports without foreign exchange cover under the terms of Instrução 113
was thus crucial to make possible high investment, and hopefully, high growth. About
75% of the foreign investment inflow into Brazil in 1956-1960 was under the regime of
Instrução 113. Seen from the angle of imports no less than 70% of capital goods imports
in the period were made under the same regime.24
Another important factor of attraction of foreign investment was the Brazilian
high tariff. The new tariff law 1957 had transformed the Brazilian schedule based on
specific duties which had been almost completely eroded by inflation into a  schedule
based on ad valorem duties which could reach 150%. Government policy, by restricting
right of establishment assured that a sufficiently low number of entrant foreign firms had
sufficient market power to extract big profits behind the high import tariff wall. On the
other hand, in the mid 1950’s there was interest to expand productive capacity abroad,
especially among European motor car manufacturers.    
Under Kubitschek there was no attempt to modernise public administration
machinery. This was a corollary of the ‘fifty years in five’ motto combined with a
consensus that bureaucratic foot dragging should not be allowed to interfere with the
Programa de Metas’s implementation. Typically, the existing machinery was
circumvented mostly by the creation of transitional institutional arrangements. These
took the form of grupos executivos [executive groups] created ad hoc to oversee the
sectoral implementation of the Programa de Metas. But state enterprises also played an
important role in the process of side stepping the traditional obstacles to
“efficient”government. The conventional public administration machinery was left aside
to continue in its long term declining trend portrayed by the mutually self-reinforcing
combination of low levels of pay and low levels of efficiency.
The Programa de Metas certainly marked a deepening in the process of import
substitution which became important in branches of industry unaffected until then such as
the automotive industry and many segments of the production of industrial inputs, and to
a lesser extent, of capital goods. But, given the scope for foreign direct investment, it is a
tribute to Kubitschek’s political acumen that he managed to see that his image of an
economic nationalist prevailed in the Brazilian  political folklore. A reasonable
explanation for his achievement is perhaps the emphasis placed in the Brasília project as
a symbol of a new sense of nationhood more representative of the Brazilian hinterland
realities away from the relatively cosmopolitan coastal regions. His image as a nationalist
was also enhanced by the fact that in the public mind the President when faced with a
choice repeatedly opted for ‘development’ instead of ‘stabilisation’. The yearly net inflow25
of direct foreign investment including reinvestment rose from less than US$ 60 million
yearly on average in 1947-1954 to  almost US$ 140 million in 1955-1961.
While it is generally accepted that stabilisation objectives had a very low priority
under Kubitschek the favourable evaluation of other aspects of his administration
especially in the political field tends to obscure how bad was the macroeconomic
management between 1956 and 1961 and the extent to which, aggravated by Quadros’
political irresponsibility in 1961 it contributed to the economic turmoil which was an
essential element to explain the military coup of 1964. If the traditional Brazilian
paradigm of the ‘homem cordial’, who in all circumstances feels it difficult to say no,
which is ruled by the heart, can be transposed to policy-making, Kubitschek, with his
utter disregard for macroeconomic constraints, fitted it extremely well. It would certainly
be an exaggeration to consider his behaviour as strategic, though his lack of enthusiasm
for electing a successor of his own party was well known. Kubitschek was simply
applying at the Federal level the populist recipe which had been extremely successful in
his mayorship of Belo Horizonte and when he was governor of Minas Gerais. From a
macroeconomic point of view Kubitschek’s vengeance was that he left to Quadros an
inheritance even worse than the one that he had received in 1956.
Inflation in 1956 measured by consumer prices was at about the same level of
1954-1955. In 1957 it declined to 15% and on average remained at the same level in
1958. But yearly data hide important monthly fluctuations. In 1956 monthly inflation
rates were maintained below 2% and in 1957 after some instability consumer prices fell
in some months almost 2% due to the very good crop. But in early 1958 inflation
accelerated once again to reach 2.6% in May. Inflationary pressures originated in the
continued imbalance of public accounts as the government deficit mounted to 26% of
total expenditure in 1956 and 40% in 1957, boosted by the building of Brasília, the new
capital, by the chronic deficit of government-owned transportation concerns and by
purchases of surplus coffee output. These latter amounted in the second half of the 1950’s
to three times the direct cost -- estimated at 2-3% of GDP -- of building Brasília. Coffee
purchases absorbed more resources than those generated by the wedge between the
average exchange rates for the sale and the purchase of foreign exchange which was a
feature of the multiple exchange rate regimes in force during the period. Transfers to
government-owned transportation concerns fluctuated between 10% and 25% of the26
aggregate deficit in 1956-1960. On the revenue side from the mid-1950’s growth of
consumption and stamp tax revenues started to outpace income tax growth. The 1957
reform also meant that import duties became relevant again. By 1961 Federal revenue
was made up of taxes on consumption (38.8%), income (26.5%), import and stamp duties
(both 11.3%). Both the consumption tax and the tax on sales, which had displaced export
taxes as the main source of revenue for the states, were value added taxes but taxes on the
value of transactions with all the resulting distortions due to cascading. The tax burden
increased from 15% in 1947-1950 to 16.3% in 1950-1955 and 19% in 1956-1960.
Inflation total transfers (including inflation tax effects on the public and the banks) rose
to around 4% of GDP in the mid-1950’s.
The deterioration of macroeconomic conditions led to still another stabilisation
attempt. Lucas Lopes and Roberto Campos with a delay of two and half years seemed to
have their chance to implement a stabilisation programme: a one-year Programa de
Estabilização Monetária [Programme of Monetary Stabilisation] was to be implemented
as a first step in the road to stabilisation. But Kubitschek resisted to abandon his
cherished expenditure plans and his half-hearted launching of the stabilisation
programme was an indication that it was doomed to fail. The plan’s core was familiar:
credit control and expenditures cuts, especially of transfers to public-owned railways and
shipping companies. There was some progress in relation to the public deficit which was
halved in 1958 to 20% of total expenditure. But banking system loans to the private
sector, including the Bank of Brazil,  fell only modestly due to the pressure of coffee
growers squeezed by the coffee crisis. In spite of much criticism of the Bank of Brazil as
responsible for undermining of the programme its loans fell almost 16% in 1959 in real
terms. The second half of the 1950’s were marked by the continued fall of real credit per
unit of GDP which decreased a further 23% between 1956 and 1960.
Under Lopes the monthly inflation rate measured by the wholesale price index
remained above 2% until May 1959 and was above 5% in some of the months of the
Summer of 1959.  Ironically, in July, when the inflation rate reached its lowest rate since
the beginning of 1958, Lopes was substituted by Paes de Almeida, the former president of
the Bank of Brazil. The emphasis on development prevailed. Public deficits increased
again, reaching 25-26% of total expenditure in 1959-1960. The yearly inflation rate for
1959 of nearly 40% was probably a record since the early 1890’s.27
 Protracted negotiations with the International Monetary Fund came to nothing as
the Lopes-Campos group lost influence. The Fund was apparently prepared to accept the
Brazilian proposals on monetary and fiscal policies but deemed unsatisfactory changes in
tariff and exchange rate policies. It was announced that  Brazil had broken off relations
with the Fund. Brazil, of course, remained a member of the Fund and rather than a
‘ruptura com o Fundo’[break with the Fund] there was something rather less spectacular:
a break down of negotiations with the Fund. The myth of  the ‘ruptura com o Fundo’ and
its astute political exploitation by Kubitschek enhanced his reputation as a nationalist
who had the courage to defy the IMF and served as an at least partial explanation of the
bad macroeconomic performance in 1956-1961 as resulting from foreign constraints. It
was stressed, but not very convincingly, that there had been a serious intention to
stabilise, but the political price asked by the IMF was too high. Probably the price asked
was too high, but was there a serious intention to stabilise?
Structural theories of inflation were  popular in Latin America in the 1950’s and
early 1960’s. Alternative versions included from the more trivial structural imbalance
version, generally with agriculture in the role of the laggard sector, which related higher
inflation to growth above a balanced growth rate, to more complex interpretations which
related inflation acceleration to sectoral terms of trade. Brazilian versions of such
interpretations included a stress in the market power of intermediaries in the
commercialisation of foodstuffs for which there is some, but not overwhelming, empirical
basis in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s.
The exchange regime created by Instrução 70 in 1953 was simplified in 1957.
The introduction of an ad valorem tariff schedule made it possible to reduce the number
of multiple import exchange rates which had been created mainly as a substitute for such
a tariff. The former five import categories were reduced to two: a general category to
include raw materials, capital goods and products for which there was not ‘sufficient
supply’. Imports of other goods were to be paid using the ‘special’ category exchange rate
which of course made them more expensive. A third category of imports, oil, newsprint,
fertilisers and ‘equipment for priority projects’ were to be paid at the ‘câmbio de
custo’[cost of exchange rate] which could not be below the weighted average export rate.
Auctions for the two import categories as well as the four export bounty categories were28
maintained but in later years non-traditional exports were increasingly paid at the free
‘rate’. A newly created Conselho de Política Aduaneira [Customs Policy Council] with
wide discretionary powers to classify imports in different categories as well as to partially
waive duties or block imports using the ‘similarity criterion’ which blocked imports of
products which could be produced domestically. One third of Brazilian imports still
originated in the United States but some European suppliers, especially Germany, had
been gaining ground in the 1950’s.
Exports fell steadily during Kubitschek’s government. In 1958-1960 they reached
US$ 1.2-1.3 billion compared to more than US$ 1.7 billion in 1951. In spite of the
advance of industrialisation Brazil remained very much an exporter of commodities and
mainly of coffee. Coffee exports which in the early 1950’s where 60-70% of total exports
maintained their importance in the middle of the decade and fell only slightly below 60%
in 1960. The US market still absorbed around 45% of total exports and Europe under
30%. Coffee prices by the end of 1955 were back to their levels of the beginning of 1953.
In 1957 they started to decline again as the well-known long-term coffee price cycle
unfolded. In 1959-1961 coffee export prices were roughly two thirds of 1955-1957 prices
due to a collapse in the second half of 1958. Coffee scarcity in the early 1950’s
stimulated substantial expansion of supply both in Brazil and elsewhere so that in the
second half of the 1950’s Brazil was once again facing problems of coffee
overproduction.   
Over Kubitschek’s term of office the foreign debt increased by 64% to reach US$
2,372 million by the end of 1960 so that the gross debt-export ratio deteriorated from 1.02
by the end of 1955 to 1.87 by the end of  1960, as exports were roughly stagnant. In the
window of opportunity created by the hope of sustained adoption of a stabilisation
programme there was an interruption of the World Bank abstinence from lending to
Brazil as US$ 98 million of loans were provided to the electricity sector in Brazil. In the
later years of the Kubitscheck period the government repeatedly resorted to high cost US
dollar-cruzeiro swap operations guaranteed by the gold reserves through which the
government raised foreign exchange cover in the short term and accepted the devaluation
risk.29
Levels of social indicators were still very low in 1960: average infant mortality
was 118.1 per thousand 1,000 live births (198.2 in Rio Grande do Norte and 68.6 in Rio
Grande do Sul) and the aggregate literacy was 60.6% (57.3% among women). But they
had improved substantially more in the 1950’s than in the 1940’s: at a rate 2.2 times
higher for infant mortality and 2.5 times higher in the case of literacy. But improvement
was much slower in the poorer than in the richer regions: reduction in infant mortality in
the South region in the 1950’s was 2.1 faster – in terms of percentage of the gap (in
relation to targets)  reduced in the decade – than in the Northeast.
The ratio between productivity of labour in manufacturing industry increased
substantially in relation to productivity in agriculture to reach 7.5 times as recorded by
the 1949 census. Industrial employment increased 3% yearly in the 1950’s while the
industrial output increased 9.2%. In fact industrial employment increased marginally less
in the 1950’s than in the 1940’s. Only a small part of the very substantial increase in
industrial productivity is estimated to have had origin in changes in the structure of
occupation. Agricultural employment increased 1.8% yearly and agricultural labour
productivity increased by 30% in the decade. In the 1950’s the share of agricultural
employment in total active population fell only modestly from 57.8% to 54%. The
acceleration of the rate of population growth meant that there were going to be in the
future increasing strains to absorb the cohorts of labourers seeking employment and the
services sector would tend to absorb such manpower surpluses. In contrast with the
second half of the 1940’s, minimum wage policy in the 1950’s was relevant, as there was
some attempt to keep constant its real value which reached a peak in 1959. In a rather
innocuous effort to contain some of the undesirable consequences of higher inflation the
Federal government tried to control basic food prices in the 1950’s and early 1960’s
through the Comissão Federal de Abastecimento e Preços-COFAP (Federal Commission
of Supply and Prices). Different modalities of rent control were also adopted in the
1950’s.
In the late 1950’s there were efforts for the first time by the Federal government
to consider in a more systematic way policies related to the removal concerning the
inequalities between different Brazilian regions. The recognition of such inequalities
stretched long before 1930. The drought in the late 1870’s had an important role in
expelling population from the Northeast to other regions such as the Amazon. An30
important public works programme had been undertaken under Epitácio Pessoa in the
early 1920’s to build up reservoirs in the Northeast. Both the São Francisco and the
Amazon valleys had public agencies nominally in charge of promoting their development
since the 1940’s. An obsolete and ineffective Departamento Nacional de Obras contra as
Secas [National Anti-Drought Department] had failed to make substantial progress in
alleviating the effects of periodical droughts in the Northeast. Under President
Kubitschek efforts were concentrated on the study of regional inequalities and
formulation of policies to revert such trends. A Grupo de Trabalho para o
Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (GTDN) [Working Group for the Development of the
Northeast] was created. Its conclusions suggested two lines to cope with the economic
problems in the Northeast. The first, which was to remain a dead letter, was to adopt
policies which would foster the transformation of land use both in the humid and semi-
arid zones, and the dislocation of the region’s agricultural frontier. The second was to
raise the  productivity of labour employed in the humid region by creating industrial jobs.
Following these recommendations a Superintendência de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste
(Sudene) [Superintendency of Development of the Northeast] was created in  1959 and
massive fiscal incentives were directed to finance the migration of investments to the
region but this occurred mostly after 1964.
It has become customary to claim that the Programa de Metas was successfully
implemented in 1957-1961. But success has to be qualified even if account is not taken of
its heavy macroeconomic cost. It is certainly relevant to stress that the Brazilian economy
went through a period of vary rapid growth and that this was explained to a large extent
by the investments planned under the plan. But the comparison of sectoral targets and
achievements point out to a clear division between targets which were seriously pursued
and those which were not. There was an unqualified failure in meeting targets concerning
wheat, coal, railway construction and oil refining. The most successful effort was in
relation to road building whose target was exceeded by 38% and electric power
generation projects which met 82% of their target. The fulfilment of many targets
concerning the production of steel, cement, oil and  cars and trucks remained between 60
and 76% of initial plans.
But these shortcomings are put in perspective by the outstanding growth record of
the period. GDP increased on average by 8.1% yearly between 1955 and 1960.  1956 was31
quite a bad year as GDP increased only 2.9%, the worst performance on record since
1947. If the plan period of 1957-1961 is taken into account GDP growth was of  9.3%
yearly. The  Programa de Metas raised gross fixed capital formation as a proportion of
GDP from around 14.5-15% in 1956-1957 to peak levels of 17% in 1958 and 18% and
1959. The extremely high rates of GDP growth suggest that increased capacity utilisation
probably played a relevant role as a source of growth in the late 1950’s. Between 1956
and 1961 industrial output increased at 11.4% yearly. This was of course concentrated in
the branches of industry directly or indirectly most affected by the Programa de Metas:
transport equipment (42% yearly rate of output growth), electrical and communications
equipment (24.1%) and rubber products (16.4%). But even traditional sectors such as
textiles had a good performance with output expanding at more than 10% yearly.
Estimates of the relative importance of sources of industrial growth indicate that about a
third of industrial growth between 1949 and 1962 was related to a fall in the import
coefficient rather than demand or export growth.  This very good industrial performance
tends to hide the  fact that agricultural performance was very creditable with output
increasing at 5.8% yearly. Food production for domestic consumtion (beef, milk, manioc,
corn, beans and rice) more than kept pace with population growth.
3. Crisis in the early 1960s
It is essential to put into perspective the achievements of Kubitschek to consider
the long-term effects of policies adopted during his term of office. His successor, Jânio
Quadros rightly stressed how unfavourable was the inherited macro-economic position:
high inflation, fiscal imbalance and prospective balance of payments crisis with eroded
reserves. His main objective became inflationary control and this was to be achieved
through policies which removed constraints related to the public deficit and the balance
of payments. Steps were taken to unify the exchange rate: the former ‘general category’
imports were transferred to the so-called free market. The ‘câmbio de custo’, which
applied to imports deemed essential such as wheat, fuels and newsprint, was devalued
100% (cruzeiro/US$ dollar rate) and transferred to the free market. But auctions for the
‘special category’, that is non-essential imports, continued to take place. A new system of
sale of foreign exchange to cover imports was introduced. This was based on the
compulsory purchase of import bills made at the same time exchange cover was bought
by importers of the same amount in cruzeiros of bills which would mature in 150 days.32
Already in the end of the Kubitschek period some exporters were paid in Bank of Brazil
paper rather than in cash but this was discontinued by the end of 1961. In certain periods
between 1962 and 1964 the importer could decide between purchasing Bank of Brazil
paper earning 6% yearly for four months or make non-interest deposits for larger
amounts.  Part of coffee export proceeds continued to be retained and other exporters
could sell export proceeds in the free market.
The reform meant the end of possibility of using the ‘ágios e bonificações’
account to generate resources in domestic currency. Suggestions that this is at the root of
disequilibrium of government accounts and consequently of inflation seem to be
displaced. The net result of such accounts had not been always substantial  in the past and
the fall in their importance had been counterbalanced by other ways to raise revenue such
as sales of import bills or compulsory import deposits. Balance of payments equilibrium
required the re-schedule of foreign debt service payments which were heavily
concentrated in the short-term: more than 60% in the four years following 1960. Foreign
debt service increased very fast since 1955,  rising from 13% of exports to 43.6% in 1960.
The service of loans totalling US$  1.1 billion, of which 80% in the United States, was
rescheduled in 1961. This was Quadros’main achievement.
The political crisis which followed Quadros’ sudden resignation in August 1961
increased uncertainty about future developments which could unfavourably affect the
economy. It was feared that Goulart, the Vice-President who according to constitution
was to succeed Quadros, would only add to the trend towards increasing lack of control
which had become marked since the demise of the ‘Programa de Estabilização
Monetária’ of 1958-1959. Since his experience as Vargas’ Labour Minister in 1954
Goulart had been elected Vice-President both in 1955 and 1960 with strong support of the
trade unions. These fears were not totally allayed by the compromise which introduced a
parliamentary regime and curtailed presidential powers.
The composition of the first cabinet revealed an attempt by Goulart  to enter into
a composition with the conservatives. The choice of Neves as Prime Minister and,
especially, Moreira Salles, a politically influential banker in the centre of the political
spectrum, as Finance Minister, suggest a continuity of the endeavour to regain control
over the economy. Neves’ program was, however, mainly rhetorical and full of33
inconsistencies. The government was going to seek to revert the massive monetary
expansion which had resulted from the political crisis in mid-1961 and to maintain
monetary supply stable. Public deficit was to be financed on an undefined ‘non-
inflationary’ basis. Lip-service was paid to many reforms, including a fiscal reform which
was to generate resources which would make possible to increase fixed gross capital
formation from 14% to 23.75% of GDP in five years. A realist foreign exchange policy
was to be adopted based on a single exchange rate but quantitative import limits in the
‘special category’were to be maintained. Goulart, in spite of opposition by his cabinet,
entered into a personal commitment to reform the constitutional principle that acquisition
of land for land reform purposes should be on a cash basis only.
The economic record in 1961 was not that unfavourable: inflation remained
roughly stable at around 30% a year (cost of living Rio de Janeiro) and GDP increased
8.6% with industrial output growing 11% and agriculture 7.6%. But there was a sharp fall
in gross capital formation to 13.1% of GDP, the lowest level since 1950.  the foreign debt
increased by US$ 0.5 billion to US $ 2,835 million at the end of the year in the wake of
the negotiations on rescheduled payments. This corresponded to a gross debt-export ratio
of 2.0. Reserves increased by US$ 307 million as exports recovered by about 10% but
still remained much below their 1951 peak.
Coffee exports in the Goulart years still answered for 50-53% of total exports.
The United States still absorbed 40% of Brazilian exports but was being rapidly
substituted by Europe. In early 1960 the Treaty of Montevideo had been signed
establishing the Latin American Free Trade Association which included most South
American economies and Mexico. The total elimination of trade barriers was to be
achieved in twelve years by means of yearly negotiations which would reduce by at least
8% the the weighted average duties applicable to third countries in favour of LAFTA
members. After a promising start in 1962 and 1963 negotiations the process came to a
halt.
Import-related remittances had been discouraged by thinly disguised devaluation
such as the increase to 150% of the import value of the compulsory purchase of import
bills which had to be held for 150 days without earning interest with the inflation around
30% a year. Financial operations required purchases equivalent to 50% of the remittance34
to be held for 180 days. In early 1962 these measures were temporarily reversed as the
percentage of required purchases was to be progressively reduced by 10 points monthly.
The marked deterioration of relations with the United States had political reasons
since the shifts implied by Quadros new policies and , especially, after Brazil had
abstained from the vote to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States. Brazil-
United States relations were further strained by impending legislation, reminiscent of
Vargas’much criticised speech in the end of 1951, that would set a 10% limit on yearly
remittances by foreign firms and that reinvestment could not serve as a basis for
computation of  profits which could be remitted. And also by the cancellation of mining
rights of the Hanna Corporation and the condonation by the Federal government of
Governor Brizola’s expropriation of Companhia Telefônica Nacional [National
Telephone Company], a subsidiary of the International Telephone and Telegraph which
operated in Rio Grande do Sul. This expropriation followed a previous wave of
expropriations in 1959, also by Brizola, of the Companhia de Energia Elétrica Rio-
Grandense [Electrical Energy Company of Rio Grande], a subsidiary of the American
Foreign Power Company, and of other ITT assets. The yearly net inflow of new direct
investment was sharply reduced to less than a third of its level in the second half of the
1950’s but reinvestments were significantly higher as investments matured.
It is not surprising that foreign debt growth slowed down after the renegotiations
of 1961: it increased less than 9% until the end of 1963. This reflected the increasing
difficulties of raising foreign loans as the government’s became progressively more
nationalist and hostile to foreign investment. The United States  official loans which were
extended under the Alliance for Progress programme were mainly directed to states
where governors were political opponents of the President.  Inter-American Development
Bank’s loans totalling US$ 133 million in 1961-1963 provided some relief. The debt-
ratio of 2.47 was high but still very distant from the 4.0-5.0 range typical of the great
depression or of the early 1980s.
Goulart’s visit to the United States in April 1962 to reassure the US government
on foreign investment and the foreign debt was not a success.  It was clear that there was
a progressive deepening of the fiscal crisis. The public deficit increased from 26.1% of
total expenditure in 1960 to 29% in 1961 and then to 33-34% in 1962-1963. The tax35
burden fell to 18.2% in 1961-1963 and seignoriage increased from 4% to 7-9% of GDP.
Most of the pressure on the level of expenditures was related to the massive deficits of
public-owned enterprises such as the railways and shipping companies: Rede Ferroviária
Federal [Federal Railways Network], Lloyd Brasileiro [Brazilian Lloyd] and Cia. de
Navegação Costeira [Coastline Navigation Company].  In May 1962 the lack of fiscal
and monetary control became evident and added to political difficulties centring on
structural reforms and foreign policy. Neves, very much a man of the centre, resigned and
an aborted further attempt to counter deterioration in the control of macro-economic
policy was made when the name of Santiago Dantas was considered for Prime Minister.
In spite of being more often associated with the more radical leanings of Goulart’s
administration because of his support of a foreign policy more independent in relation to
the United States, he was firmly committed to a policy of ordering government priorities,
expenditure cuts and monetary restraint. His inability to win congressional approval as
Prime Minister underlined the costs of the political stalemate.
After a further attempt to obtain congressional support for special powers for his
chosen Prime Minister, Brochado da Rocha, Goulart invested all his political resources in
recovering presidential bargaining power with the repeal  of the parliamentary regime.
But after this attempt the political basis of the coalition in government was eroded as
shown by the substitution of Moreira Salles by Dantas. Strengthening of the parties
supporting Goulart in the elections in October 1962 was followed by a massive victory of
a return to a presidential regime in early 1963 amid further acceleration of inflation to
reach 5-7% a month and continued slowing down of growth. In 1962 financial system
real credit stagnated. The yearly inflation rate in 1962 rose to a level near 50% whatever
way it is measured. Additional inflationary pressures were related by the approval in the
end of 1962 of new legislation on the ‘13th’ wage, an additional monthly wage to be paid
to all workers at the end of the year.
GDP growth fell to 6.6%, the lowest rate since 1956. But manufacturing industry
output which had played a central role in the growth process since 1942, and especially
under Kubitcheck, still increased 8.1%. Agricultural output increased by 5.5% even if
coffee production fell in physical terms. The good agricultural record since the mid-
1950’s tended to undermine the core of the case for land reform as the growth of food
production was not being outpaced by population growth. Data on fixed capital formation36
point out to a recovery to 15.5% of GDP in 1962 which is not unlikely to have resulted
from defective national accounts statistics as most sectoral data point out to a sharp fall in
investment after 1961.
The fall in exports and in capital inflows together with the modest rise in imports,
maintained pressure on the balance of payments  But there is no evidence of severe
distortions in the foreign exchange regime. There was a reduction in the compulsory
purchases of import bills and the cruzeiro devaluation was similar to the rate of domestic
inflation. It would be wrong to put too much emphasis on the foreign exchange policy to
explain the balance of payments difficulties: the effective exchange rate in 1962 was at
practically the same level of that of 1964 and, according to the World Bank, very near its
peak (most devalued) level between the early 1960’s and the late 1970’s. It was in 1963
that it became overvalued but not much beyond the level typical of the second half of the
1960’s.
Followinf the government’s victory in reversing the parliamentary constitutional
amendment of 1961 in a referendum in early 1963 a last ditch attempt was made to revert
the acceleration of inflation. Celso Furtado, who had added to his reputation as an author
on the Brazilian economy the work developed at the GTDN and at Sudene, supervised the
ellaboration of a Plano Trienal [Triennial Plan] was to serve as a guideline for policy
placing strong emphasis, in spite of the   heterodox views held by Furtado in the past, on
the control of inflation and singled out excessive demand entailed by the excessive level
of public expenditure. The aim of the stabilisation programme was to reduce inflation to
25% in 1963 and 10% in 1965. Potential public deficit was to be reduced by 60%.
Nominal limits of credit expansion for the private sector were set at 35% when the
equivalent yearly inflation rate was 60%. An International Monetary Fund mission visited
Brazil early in the year.
The plan allowed for ‘corrective’ inflation as there was need to adjust some
administered prices, following subsidy cuts mainly affecting fuel and wheat. In January
urban transportation prices were increased. Prices of fuel and wheat were increased by
100% and 70 %, respectively. Monthly inflation rates in the first two months of 1963
reached 20% and 11%. This may have been partly the result of price adjustment of those
fearing a price freeze.37
There is evidence of considerable overshooting in the implementation of credit
limits: the real volume of  credit fell 30% in the first semester of 1963. This certainly
helped to fuel the choir of criticisms initially raised by many of Goulart’s allies in the
extreme left.  The Plano Trienal was criticised as a capitulation of the government to
conditions established by the International Monetary Fund. To the political troubles
aggravated by overshooting must be added the consequences of Dantas’ failure in his visit
to Washington to negotiate another reschedule of the foreign debt. In spite of Brazilian
concessions concerning the expropriation of the AMFORP utilities, only US$ 84 million
of the US$ 398 million of loans obtained by Dantas was to be immediately available and
even then US$ 30 million were to compensate ITT. Political decisions in May
irreversibly undermined the stabilisation objectives as the civil service pay rise was set at
60%, and not the 40% agreed with the IMF. The minimum wage was increased by
56.25%. Wheat and fuel subsidies were reintroduced.
From mid-1963 economic policy was beyond the control of Federal authorities. A
ministerial reform substituted Dantas and scraped the Planning Ministry. Goulart tried to
appease widespread criticism of his government among the ‘classes produtoras’ by
choosing a conservative Paulista, Carvalho Pinto, as the new Finance minister. But the
reaction of the more radical wing of his political supporters was strident as it had been in
their denunciation of the Plano Trienal. Administrative instability resulted from the
fragmentation of political resources originating in the frontal clash between populism and
its opponents, and a broad conservative coalition rapidly gained adherents. Campos’
decision to ask for substitution as the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington heralded the
end of the period of guarded co-operation between Goulart and conservative leaders
which could assure him of some support outside his power basis in the trade unions and
the left wing parties. The lack of control on public expenditure deepened after the middle
of the year. Monthly inflation rates rapidly returned and exceeded the levels reached
before the Plano Trienal. The balance of payments position deteriorated further in spite
of some recovery of exports as coffee prices increased 60% . Required purchases of
import bills were substantially increased, especially in the second semester of 1963,
reflecting growing uncertainty. On a year to year basis the real exchange rate appreciated
almost 14% in 1963.38
Goulart’s obvious lack of a credible economic programme is best exemplified by
his appointment of an obscure gaucho politician as a substitute of Carvalho Pinto in the
end of 1963. Goulart also finally approved the law on remittances of profits by foreign
firms. The demand for structural reforms, on the other hand, gained political weight
although there was an almost total absence of explicit economic evaluation of  their costs
and benefits. Attention was centred on the proposed take over of private oil refineries
whose establishment preceded the creation of Petrobrás, which can hardly be considered
a structural reform, and, quite generically, on land reform. Political troubles with the
military and agitation around the structural reforms fed the conspiracy against the
government which had initially been restricted to certain groups defeated in their intent to
deliver a coup in the crisis of 1961 and had gained strength after the 1962 elections. The
military coup which followed on the 1
st of April had considerable political support from
most political parties as well as from landowners, industrialists, and the middle class.
In the whole 1942-1962 period GDP per capita only decreased in 1956, and even
so very marginally. In 1963 GDP growth was only 0.6% as a fall of 0.2% in industrial
output coincided with agricultural output growth of only 1%. Recession hit hardest
exactly in those sectors which had led the previous boom. Output fell by 10.7% in
transport equipment and 3.8% in electrical equipment industries. It fell modestly even in
the wage goods sectors. There was a fall in the rate of growth of food production in the
early 1960’s in comparison with the second half of the 1950’s. But it still remained above
population growth in the case of most products with the exception of beef and corn.
In per capita terms GDP contracted 2.3% in 1963. It is difficult to overstate the
political significance of such a break of an extremely good continuous growth record. The
reasons which explain such a decline in growth were the subject of intense controversy.
The whole picture is confused by the fact that national accounts data indicate a hefty rise
in investment even in 1963. According to such data, fixed capital formation in 1963, at
17% of GDP, had been only exceeded since 1947 in golden year of 1959. Data on
sectoral data fail to pick up this reversal in the new trend lower investment ratios first
shown in 1961. Possible explanations could include the inability of the Federal
government to impose rational cuts in its investment programs so that fixed proportional
cuts affected similarly all projects whatever their initial marginal efficiency of capital.
Large investments did  not necessarily mean a similarly large expansion of productive39
capacity given the postponement entailed by cuts in available resources. An alternative
less convincing reason, at least for this period, is that import substitution deepening
tended to increase the cost of inputs and capital goods so that investment became
relatively more expensive.
Explanations of a structural nature underline the importance of the exhaustion of
import substitution as a process able to assure high growth of manufacturing industrial
output. Given that the initial size of plants installed in answer to incentives under
Kubitschek exceeded the capacity of Brazilian markets to absorb their output it was to be
expected that the first wave of investments could not be sustained. The deepening of
import-substitution moreover meant that as new sectors were affected the relevant
marginal capital-output ratio increased and contributed to reduce growth potential.
Another line of structural reasoning stressed the lack of compatibility between the newly
structure of supply and effective demand related to the heavily concentrated income
distribution. This latter explanation was disposed of by the very high rates of growth
achieved during the boom period after 1967 based on a dramatic expansion of credit for
consumer durable purchases.
Alternative explanations stress the impact of the extremely contractionary short-
term macroeconomic policy adopted in the first few months of 1963 on the level of
industrial output as well of investment. There is no doubt that liquidity tightening in early
1963 strongly affected the performance of sectors producing durable consumer goods.
But the link between the squeeze under the Plano Trienal and the fall in investment,
which is any case rather difficult to measure, given the misleading information supplied
by national accounts data,  fails to take into account the expected lags between fall in
output and fall in investment. Based on the available evidence it seems reasonable to
explain the fall in the level of activity as resulting from the combination of both structural
and short-term or mid-term policies.
* * *
The economic record in the Third Republic was dominated by the achievement of
fast and sustained growth of GDP. Industry substantially increased its importance in
output by displacing agriculture, especially in the 1950’s. The extreme disparities40
between productivity in industry and the other sectors of the economy increased, as the
expansion of industrial output was not matched by the creation of a sufficiently large
number of industrial jobs. But the performance of the food-producing agricultural sector
was far from mediocre in the 1950’s and even the early 1960’s. There were also
important changes in the structure of industrial output itself as there was much more rapid
expansion of sectors producing durable consumer goods and industrial inputs, and to a
lesser extent, capital goods than of those wage good sectors which had led industrial
output growth in the 1930’s and in the 1940’s. There is more continuity between Dutra,
Vargas to a lesser extent, Café Filho, and Kubitschek periods than usually admitted.
Growth was faster and import substitution affected increasingly more sophisticated
branches of industry but the trend was there.
Modernisation of the productive structure notwithstanding Brazil remained an
exporter of commodities and mostly of coffee. Export diversification had no place in the
government’s agenda. In fact one of the most impressive features of economic policy in
the second half of the 1950’s is the continued importance of expenditures to  support
coffee prices. The coffee wedge between average import and export exchange rates may
have existed to extract income from coffee growers but a sizeable part of this was
returned through transfers to the coffee sector, either purchasing surplus stocks or
providing a stimulus to the  destruction of older, less productive, coffee trees.
What made possible to achieve and sustain this path of high growth was the
combination of an initially stabilisation-induced overvaluation of the exchange with
import control, assuring absolute protection essential to foster import substitution,
followed by the expedient of using the multiple exchange regime to provide powerful
subsidies to attract foreign capital to the Brazilian market. The government also used
generously other subsidies such as subsidised credit and fiscal rebates of various kinds to
implement its industrial policy. An additional crucial feature of the policy was that the
Brazilian market would remain for all purposes closed so that the output of foreign firms
would not face competition from imports. There was a vicious circle in action. The
balance of payments constraints stimulated the adoption of policies based on the heavy
subsidisation of domestic production which depended crucially on closing up the market.
Domestic production was not competitive in international markets so exports tended to
depend exclusively on commodities. Evaluation of such policies crucially depend on the41
time span which is used as reference. If evaluation is restricted to period when import-
substitution took place the assessment tends to be favourable as the growth record tends
to dominate the picture.
But in a long term perspective such industrialisation spurts had a cost which was
that generally they were not accompanied by sound macroeconomic policy. While this
was already evident in the later period of the Dutra administration, and even more of the
Vargas administration, it became particularly clear under Kubitschek and reached a
climax under Goulart. Growth was faster until 1961 but partly because of a sharp
deterioration in the accepted standards of sustainable macroeconomic policy. Political
calculation became an extremely short-sighted exercise when applied to the economic
field. The concept that the economic inheritance which was left to the successor should
be at least reasonable carried no weight. The repeated failure of stabilisation efforts,
generally implemented in the first half of terms of office, resulted more from the
persistent fiscal imbalances and the lack of agreement to put their redressing high in the
political priority list than on structural sources such as stagnant food supply or sectoral
market power.
Rent-seeking which had been concentrated in coffee and tariff policies during the
Old Republic had been diversified in the 1930’s to cover opportunities opened by the
operation of multiple exchange rate regimes. In the last years of  World War II relatively
high inflation combined with the usury law enhanced the importance of public credit,
particularly long-term credit, as a powerful instrument to extract resources from the State.
All these rent-extraction mechanisms were preserved from the late 1940’s to the early
1960’s with the multiple exchange rate regimes offering new implicit subsidy
opportunities as exemplified by the advantages favouring foreign direct investment
through SUMOC’s Instrução 113. During part of the period the role played by the high
tariff in providing an umbrella for domestic producers to generate high profits, or to be
very inefficient, or both, was played entirely by the exchange rate system as the specific
tariff was eroded  by inflation until the schedule became based on ad valorem duties in
1957. The discretionary power in the distribution of incentives tended to be exerted in a
less centralised way that had been the case in the past as there was strong private sector
representation in the sectorally organised grupos executivos.42
By the second half peak of the 1950’s distortions were affecting resource
allocation in extremely complex forms. It is to be doubted whether the government had a
very precise idea of the joint impact of so many instruments used at the same time. The
foreign exchange wedge between average import and export exchange rates was at work.
Special provisions favoured foreign investment. A high tariff still prevailed with the
government strengthening its de jure and de facto grasp on the right of establishment of
foreign firms in the Brazilian market. Not only in some cases such as banking and
insurance the government could and would block the entry of new players, by denying
subsidies to more than a certain number of previously selected the firms, the government
could make unprofitable the entry of new competitors into the market. The activities of
many public-owned suppliers of public services depended on massive subsidisation. The
coffee sector was also being subsidised directly and indirectly to counter the effects of the
collapse of coffee prices. The fiscal burden became impossible to bear: there were too
many sectors demanding and obtaining resources from the State. The inability to choose
between conflictive targets was to be become increasingly a feature which determined
economic policy under the Third Republic. In last couple of years this shortcoming
entirely dominated the economic and political scene.
The campaign for structural reforms singled out land reform as requiring the
special attention of the government. But this was perhaps a too limited view of the
limitations of growth policies adopted until then. Very rapid growth had only been
accompanied by rather slow improvement in the living conditions of the poor
everywhere. The position of social indicators improved in the government’s list of
priorities does not seem to have improved, but, of course, faster growth meant relatively
more rapid improvement of such indicators in the 1950’s than had been the case in the
past. Even with high growth employment opportunities increased much too slowly.
Increased population growth together with employment trends in the 1950’s indicated the
problems ahead when growth slackened.
While the government became somewhat belatedly aware of the problems
entailed by the uneven regional distribution of the benefits of growth this trend resulted
partly from its own investment strategy. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of
decisions during Kubitschek’s term of office to define the characteristics of the future
economic structure of the Brazilian economy and consequently the type of problems it43
would face in the future. In a planning effort that was not known for internal consistency
there was a clear concentration of inducements for the creation of an important
automotive sector and in  complementary investments in enhancing of road infrastructure
and oil refining capacity. Expansion of the output of transport equipment was initially
presented as essentially an effort to substitute imports of trucks and commercial and
commercial vehicles but the seeds of an economy whose performance would depend on
the diffusion of consumer durables, and especially of motor cars, were clearly there.
  